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1. To what extent was the Treaty of Rome a Franco-German bargain?

The Treaty of Rome (TOR) established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC brought about a common market, giving members the freedom to move capital, services, people, goods as well as a customs union among the initiating states, a sizeable stepping stone in the formation of the EU. Euratom was created with the intent to develop peaceful atomic energy applications, essential for a lasting peace between the two European powers. Later absorbed into the European Community structure. The TOR was signed in Rome, March 1957 by then West Germany, Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and Belgium- describing themselves as “determined to lay the foundations of a closer union among the peoples of Europe (Daniel, K., John, P. & Richard, C., 2008). The structures of the EEC and Euratom led to the creation of; a Council of Ministers, a commission, a European Court of Justice and a Parliamentary Assembly (later morphing into the European Parliament) (Archives, by EU., 2017). This essay will assess the extent to which the Treaty of Rome (TOR) was a Franco-German bargain; how EU policies and institutions are influenced by a select few.

The Treaty of Rome committed France to the integration of its economy with fellow EEC states, but this was done mostly on French terms. The first benefit; leveraging their super power status (at the time) to steer Europe in a direction they chose. The majority of French organised interests at the time (economic, political, industrial, diplomatic and administrative) were just as resistant to the TOR as they had been to the 1951 Treaty of Paris (TOP) the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Defence and Political Communities in 1954. Politics and diplomacy steered by French soft and hard power allowed the Treaty of Rome to be devised in such a way that was unthreatening to its national autonomy and economy (Parsons (2017). Therefore, an argument could be made that the first Eurosceptic state more importantly was a founding member. This position was taken in an attempt to self-preserve as the German economy thrived off exports, preferring tariff free markets, whilst the French preferred intervention and international arrangements, where it concerned the developing states (Tilford, S., 2010). The second benefit of the TOR for France was one of mutual German-Franco interest, peace. Derived from the concept of vested interest, pooling together steel and coal resources was considered the best alternative to new conflict between France and Germany, following two wars that virtually annihilated and exhausted the European continent. The third benefit for France presented itself as freedom of movement with the suppression of border checks between member states of the EU within the Schengen area. In the new globalised world that France saw coming, any single European state would have been dwarfed, demographically and economically, by other states. Without Europe, France would probably struggle to be noticed on the world stage. Alan Milward’s 1994 stated that ‘’the founding of the ECSC marked The European Rescue of the Nation-State. Lasting peace, freedom of movement on a continental scale, a common currency, and a nascent sense of humility’’, all great benefits from the TOR. (Drake, H., 2018)

Germany signed the TOR out of necessity. Subsequent two world wars, German political influence was non-existent, and states were hesitant to trust, and German guilt was high. The British (under W. Churchill) and Americans (under H. Truman) understood the need for a revitalized Europe with Germany and France leading it. With the introduction of the Euro in 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) calculates that Germany gained competitiveness, against other major industrial states as well as all other members of the euro zone. Supported by freedom of movement and the removal of tariffs, the German deficit developed into a strong surplus.  Interestingly, many EU states lost competitiveness because unit labour costs rose more rapidly in those countries due to EU policies. Bar the euro, national currencies would have probably been devalued, but that is off the table as long as the euro zone exists, because the Eurozone/freedom of movement set-up benefits Germany disproportionately as the Schengen agreement created cheaper labour, allowing production of high-quality goods for less, whilst paying less. This has led to Germany becoming almost totally dependent on exports and investment in select sectors of its economy for growth (Analytics, H., 2011). In the words of one Frenchman the German economy is so big that, “they are number two on practically every market in the world. Number one is not always the same, but the Germans are always number two.” This vast economy was created solely on the back of the TOR and subsequently EU states (Elliott, L., 2018). Lastly, Germany has largely held back on military proliferation because of its past but the Multilateral Force, conceived by the United States to satisfy a presumed German desire for nuclear weapons may still come to fruition through a future EU Army. Which brings us to the last benefit. Germany has a stake in supporting an EU military force because of its past and the current political climate won’t allow for heavy re-armament. A multi-lateral force shoots two birds with one stone as Germany won’t be seen to be heavily re-arming. However, various sensitive commission posts held by both the Germans and French brings German-Franco influence, if not control of an EU army to the fore front giving credence to the realist, Inter-governmentalist, argument of the EU being a puppet of the more influential states. (SALM, C., 2017)

                   Inter-governmentalists argue that Germany could use its influence to re-arm through the an-envisaged EU Army and subsequently control it; A process of integration already undertaken with select German/Belgian regiments, thus bringing us to Euroscepticism. Eurosceptics stand firm in their belief that the EU project undermines national security, national sovereignty and a harmonious nation state; that the EU is elitist and lacks transparency and democratic legitimacy; that it is too wasteful and bureaucratic; that high levels of migration are encouraged to the benefit of a few states; and that it’s economic polices are responsible for current austerity measures. The economic and political aspects of the German-Franco relationship have both created problems with other states in the European Community (Elliott, L., 2018). The Benelux states have always been resentful about being pushed around by the big powers evidenced by the number of votes allocated to them. In relation to the EU-6, the original treaty distributed the votes disproportionately as follows: 4 votes: Germany, Germany, Italy, 2 votes: Netherlands, Belgium, 1 vote: Luxembourg. This system denied Luxembourg voting rights for proposed acts by the Commission. (Archives, by EU., 2017). However, British euro-scepticism posed the biggest obstacle for German-Franco European leadership. During the Rome European Council meeting, Franco-German collusion almost became counterproductive because of its obviousness; supporting the Eurosceptic/inter-governmetalist view of states as the final, determining actor within Supranational organizations. Therefore, the assertion the TOR majorly benefitted the Germans and French rubbed the less powerful, populous members outside of the EU ‘boys club’ the wrong way. (Elliott, L., 2018)

Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988 became a blueprint for sceptics which aimed to restrain European ambition asserting “To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve”. Exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, supplanted by discontent with the Maastricht treaty, which effectively created the EU as we know it demonstrated British opposition with over-arching European regulation, by EU institutions and policies. Unsurprisingly, the UK joined the EU in 1973 because they were impressed by the community’s stronger economy. This demonstrates Britain’s transactional relationship with the community. Historically, Westminster evaluated its relationship with the EU in terms of benefits and cost and not an emotional one compared with the commonwealth. Furthermore, as a latecomer, the UK often viewed the EU’s organisation and policies discordant (Booker, C. & North, R., 2016). If we are to use Britain as the Eurosceptic trigger an argument could be made attributing it’s spill over in the continent to the 1980s when Thatcher battled to cut the cyclopean British monetary contribution. Her repeated criticism of excessive EU interference in the same year spurred growing disillusion with EU member states, especially over migration and the Euro-dollar’s problems. This point, substantiated by the Eurobarometer survey, tells the story of rapid decline in trust in the EU and its institutions since it’s 2007 peak; with trust in the EU consistently below 50%. (The roots of Euroscepticism.2016)

Inter-govermentalists may be legitimate in their qualms of a TOR inspired monopoly. It could be argued that Germany benefits tremendously more from TOR set up than France. In the creation of the Eurozone the Germans argued, that first the economies had to be aligned, with co-ordinated spending, taxation, interest rates, employment and inflation (Norris, F., 2011). This suited the Germans more as their industry-based economy benefits the least from multiple euro currencies that severely fluctuated. The stance made sense if they along with the French would be carrying the Euro. At the heart of the euro-sceptic/Inter-governmentalist debate is the lop-sided number of German cabinet officials that serve on Commission cabinets. In 2016 the number of German policy advisors in commissioner’s offices numbered 31, the French were 10 behind with 21 whilst the Brits, Italians, Poles, and Spaniards trailed 18,17,13 and 11 respectively. Germany, which has 16% of the EU’s population, has 13% of cabinet jobs. Whilst France and the UK have around 13% of the EU’s population each. France has 10% of cabinet posts while the UK has 8%. Firstly, this demonstrates the disproportionate number of Germans in commission positions followed by the French with more policy advisors than the UK, with whom they have equal percentage of EU citizens. Additionally, there are more Germans than any other nationality working as heads and deputy heads of commissioner’s private offices. Four commissioners have Germans heading their offices. Five commissioners have Germans as deputy heads including Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker (Martin Selmayr). Lastly the TOR freedom of movement policy failed to comprehend the anger felt at mass immigration further fuelling the fires of European populist parties, which has increased the pool of readily available cheap labour, again disproportionately benefitting Germany. One area where France disproportionately benefits is the Common Agriculture policy (CAP). In raw terms, the financing of the CAP was originally put in place to ensure a net transfer of funds to France as a quid pro quo for opening its market to German industrial products. In 2014, 43% of the net contribution to the CAP was paid by Germany alone, with smaller amounts paid by the Netherlands, the UK and Italy (Matthews, A., 2015) displaying in essence the German-Franco relationship/bargain. Germany supports France in its areas of economic and military strategy such as the CAP and Macron’s echoed call for a European Army and in doing so France turns a blind eye to Germany’s beguiling domination and influence in the EU’s Institutions which Germany uses to support French initiatives. Neo-liberal policies such as the German introduced EU migration quotas or austerity measures currently being forced on Italy stoke the fires of Euroscepticism but more importantly benefit the German economy.

Politics and diplomacy allowed the Treaty of Rome to be devised in such a way that was unthreatening to French national autonomy and economy. Germany signed the TOR out of necessity because German political influence was non-existent, and states were hesitant to trust, and German guilt was high. With the introduction of the Euro, Germany re-gained competitiveness, against other major industrial states whilst the reverse happened to other members in the euro zone as EU policies suited and benefited Germany disproportionately. Lastly, The TOR however allows Germany and by extension the EU to have a security deterrent should the need arise without all the political kick back. Inter-governmentalists argue that Germany could use its influence to re-arm through the an-envisaged EU Army and subsequently control it along with other aspects of the community (SALM, C., 2017). Standing firm in their belief that integration undermines national security, national sovereignty and a harmonious nation state. The Benelux states have always been resentful about being pushed around by the big powers evidenced by the number of votes allocated to them. Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988 became a blueprint for sceptics which aimed to restrain European ambition. The Eurobarometer survey shows trust in the EU consistently below 50. At the heart of the euro-sceptic/Inter-governmentalist debate is the lop-sided number of German cabinet officials that serve on Commission cabinets, far outstripping officials of other nationalities. It could therefore be argued that Germany benefits tremendously more from TOR set up than France. Lastly the TOR freedom of movement policy has failed to comprehend the anger felt at mass immigration fuelling the fires of European populist parties, which has increased the pool of readily available cheap labour, again disproportionately benefitting Germany whilst France disproportionately benefits from the Common Agriculture policy (CAP). In 2014, 43% of the net contribution to the CAP was paid by Germany alone. Germany supports France in its areas of economic and military strategy and in doing so France turns a blind eye to Germany’s beguiling domination and influence in the EU’s Institutions which Germany uses to support French initiatives.

The Evidence presented makes it difficult to dispute a mutually beneficial Franco-German bargain with regards to the Treaty of Rome, and the current EU and its institutions. For the purposes of peace, they both disproportionately benefited from European integration economically and politically from an agreement specifically conceived with that intent.

References:

• Analytics, H., 2011. Germany wins, others don’t. The New York Times. Available at: https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2011/04/22/business/20110423_CHARTS_graphic.html [Accessed November 4, 2018].
• Archives, by H., 2017. Impact of the ECSC Common Assembly on the politics, negotiation and content of the Rome Treaties. European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: https://epthinktank.eu/2017/03/20/impact-of-the-ecsc-common-assembly-on-the-politics-negotiation-and-content-of-the-rome-treaties/ [Accessed November 19, 2018].
• Booker, C. & North, R., 2016. The great deception: can the European Union survive? London:
• Bloomsbury. Daniel, K., John, P. & Richard, C., 2008. The European Union: how does it work?
• Oxford: Oxford University Press. Drake, H., 2018. French relations with the European Union. Available at: http://www.worldcat.org/title/french-relations-with-the-european-union/oclc/252758388 [Accessed November 14, 2018].
• Elliott, L., 2018. The best thing Germany could do for Europe is quit the single currency – but it won’t | Larry Elliott. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/06/fix-eu-single-currency-does-not-work [Accessed November 7, 2018].
• Matthews, A., 2015. Gainers and losers from the CAP budget. Europe’s common agricultural policy is broken – let’s fix it! Available at: http://capreform.eu/gainers-and-losers-from-the-cap-budget/ [Accessed November 19, 2018].
• Norris, F., 2011. Euro Benefits Germany More Than Others in Zone. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/business/global/23charts.html [Accessed November 3, 2018].
• SALM, C., 2017. European Parliament / Think Tank. Chernobyl 30 years on: Environmental and health effects – Think Tank. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)563518 [Accessed November 19, 2018].
• NA, 2016. The roots of Euroscepticism. The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/britain/2016/03/12/the-roots-of-euroscepticism [Accessed November 2, 2018].
• Tilford, S., 2010. Germany’s euro advantage. Centre for European Reform. Available at: https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/germanys-euro-advantage [Accessed November 19, 2018].